This is an idea in order to create more inclusive and fair system for DAO governance in a standardized way.
Background: Considering there are limited number of LOOT NFTs, governance will be limited to OGs or ones that have significant capital (e.g. a lot of ETH). In order to make LOOT DAO/Treasury voting more inclusive, I propose the following mechanism.
SUMMARY
LOOT DAO governed on majority/unanimous vote of qualifying Guilds.
For a Guild to qualify for LOOT DAO vote, a pool of minimum AGLD must be established (e.g. 1MM AGLD for a LOOT DAO vote)
To govern Guild level decisions, a guild governance token (e.g. $CROWN for Crown DAO) is accrued on a fixed APY for AGLD deposited allowing for votes to consider tradeoffs between size of AGLD and time committed to the Guild.
MORE COMMENTARY TOPLayer 1: LOOT DAO / Treasury works to govern ecosystem project inclusion, funding of those projects, and any other thing the communicty as a whole wants to do with the capital.
Layer 2: GUILDS. There are a few guilds already established inside LOOT (e.g. CROWN DAO). My view is that LOOT DAO vote should be 1 vote per Guild. The problem is that creation of a Guild is organic and DAO voting manipulation can occur with infinite Guilds established. Solution here is a minimum AGLD staked inside each Guild as āskin in the gameā to qualify for a LOOT DAO vote (e.g. 1MM minimum AGLD in single guild to qualify for 1 vote for DAO). Smaller guilds can exist and freely operate on their own but cannot vote on ecosystem governance. So, we go into Layer 3.
Layer 3: Guild time/capital weighted voting power. Borrowing concepts from Defi, A Guild that wishes to establish a seat at the LOOT DAO pools AGLD and creates a subtoken (e.g. $CROWN for CROWN DAO), which serves as a proof of commitment for each guild member. For example, a CROWN guild member deposits 100 AGLD in return receives 1% APY of $CROWN. When the moment of voting occurs, whether it is to decide on LOOT DAO matters or Guild only matters, the weight of $CROWN is used to vote.
This is great, a real fantastic way to have community participation. Maybe in tandem with the ability to delegate votes to your faction we could have some diverse political factions? This would also increase the voting particpation %
Not sure why this concept hasnāt spawned more discussion from the community members most experienced with DAO formation. It is an interesting concept that solves for one of the major governance concerns: the influence of AGLD holders who hold no Loot.
I am a big fan of this proposal. It appears to make a union of LOOT and AGLD holders, thereby giving relevancy to both (after all, weāre essentially trying to retrofit AGLD here).
One question comes to mind: what about people who only hold AGLD? Could there be a pure AGLD guild that non-LOOT holders are a part of? In this scenario, either they all collectively have one vote, or there are numerous AGLD guilds that stake the minimum. Is that a problem?
I donāt think there is an issue with AGLD only
guild. Perhaps they are guild of merchants?
Thinking in terms of spawning too many AGLD only guilds, the LOOT DAO can decide higher minimum AGLD threshold at inception. If there are 8 guilds today, minimum qualifying AGLD threshold can be 6 or 7MM AGLD to acquire a LOOT DAO vote - each guild should have a tally beforehand of their AGLD balance.
Iād suggest that guilds also need a minimum number of loot. Loot is OG and must be factored in to the equation.
An example of how this could work:
Members of each guild stake their OG Loot (NOT AGLD) and receive AGLD (or their Guild token). This results in natural redistribution of AGLD to LOOT owners. This would require AGLD to be inflationary. AGLD could then be used to fund ecosystem development with strong incentives for all OG Loot holders.